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Design, Development, Testing, and Evaluation: 
Human Factors Engineering 
 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Role of Human Factors in Design, Development, Testing, and 
Evaluation (DDT&E)  
 
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5C, Appendix M, defines a system as:  “The 
combination of elements that function together to produce the capability required to meet a need. 
The elements include all hardware, software, equipment, facilities, personnel, processes, and 
procedures needed for this purpose.” 
 
Thus, humans, not only as the flight crew, but also as designers, manufacturers, and ground 
support are considered part of the spacecraft system.  All elements of the system are influenced 
by human performance.  In turn, human performance is influenced by many aspects of system 
design, including the equipment that personnel interface with, training they receive, procedures 
they use, and teamwork needed for personnel to work with each other to perform their various 
roles.  These aspects of system design are addressed by human factors engineering (HFE).   
 
HFE is a basic element of the design of many complex human-machine systems in addition to 
spacecraft systems, such as aircraft, military systems, computer systems, process control 
facilities, and medical devices.  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ (IEEE) 
Systems Engineering Standard 1220 (1998, pp.3-4) states that “the design of the products and 
life cycle processes should consider the human as an element of the system in terms of operators, 
maintainers, manufacturing personnel, training personnel, etc., for the purpose of understanding 
the human-system integration issues and ensuring that the system products are producible, 
maintainable, and usable.”  Numerous other systems engineering and U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) standards include HFE as a key component of the overall design and evaluation 
process.  The application of HFE is most important in the design of “high-risk, high-reliability 
systems” where failures can have significant consequences. 
 
The effectiveness and reliability of these systems is a function of (1) the technical performance 
of system hardware/software; (2) the effectiveness of the human elements of the system, 
including personnel performance, operational procedures, and training; (3) the operational 
environment—human-machine systems may be very effective in one operational environment, 
but not in another; and (4) the interaction of all three.  Thus, HFE is a crucial element in system 
development, acquisition, and evaluation conducted by NASA. 
 
The NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA 1995, p.18) specifies HFE as one of the 
specialty disciplines upon which Systems Engineering (SE) must rely and that will have 
important contributions throughout the system life cycle (NASA 1995, p. 34).  The NASA 
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Systems Engineering Handbook states that the Systems Engineering Management Plan “should 
contain, as needed, the approach to HFE” (NASA 1995, p. 44), and, that demonstrating “human 
factors considerations of the proposed design support the intended end users’ ability to operate 
the system and perform the mission effectively” is part of successful preparation for preliminary 
design review (NASA 1995, p.67).   
 
NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8705.2A “Human-Rating Requirements for Space 
Systems” explicitly mandates the application of HFE in the throughout the development life 
cycle of spacecraft systems and addresses of the roles typically filled by HFE.  NPR 8705.2A’s 
requirements, as they relate to the material in this chapter, are cited in the corresponding sections 
and subsections below. 
 
The general approach to HFE described in this chapter is consistent with that used for complex 
human-machine systems in other domains, such as those involving the military (DoD), 
transportation (Department of Transportation), and nuclear energy (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission).   
1.2 Scope of Human Factors Section 
While human-system interaction occurs in all phases of system development and operation, this 
chapter on Human Factors in the DDT&E for Reliable Spacecraft Systems is restricted to the 
elements that involve “direct contact” with spacecraft systems.  Such interactions will encompass 
all phases of human activity during the design, fabrication, testing, operation, and maintenance 
phases of the spacecraft lifespan.  This section will therefore consider practices that would 
accommodate and promote effective, safe, reliable, and robust human interaction with spacecraft 
systems.  By restricting this chapter to what the team terms “direct contact” with the spacecraft, 
“remote” factors not directly involved in the development and operation of the vehicle, such as 
management and organizational issues, have been purposely excluded.  However, the design of 
vehicle elements that enable and promote ground control activities such as monitoring, feedback, 
correction and reversal (override) of on-board human and automation process are considered as 
per NPR8705.2A, Section 3.3.  Finally, while Section 9.0  (Environment Control and Life 
Support Systems) of the DDT&E Report will explicitly treat environmental and life support 
matters (e.g., radiation, atmosphere), these environmental factors directly modulate human 
performance and therefore are an important consideration in crew-related human factors 
discussed here. 
1.3 Interaction between Human Factors Interaction and Other Disciplines 
HFE must interact with all engineering discipline areas.  Some of the linkages to the other 
disciplines are readily apparent, because spacecraft propulsion, guidance, navigation, and control 
(GN&C), avionics, mechanism, life support, and software systems must be operated and 
monitored by the flight crew and ground support personnel for mission success.  Likewise, all of 
the disciplines impact flight crew performance, health, and safety.  For example, structures, 
materials, and safety and mission assurance (S&MA) affect habitability, health, and safety.  
Propulsion systems impose significant acceleration and vibration loads on the vehicle and crew 
during launch, again with obvious design implications for crew performance, health, and safety.   
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Spacecraft systems will not only have to consider flight crew factors.  Spacecraft systems will 
have to be designed, built, operated, and maintained in an effective, efficient, and safe manner by 
ground personnel. 
 
During the design process, therefore, all other disciplines need to be fully aware of the impact 
their products will have on personnel (both flight crew and ground personnel) as part of the 
system as a whole, throughout the entire system life cycle.  Therefore, HFE interacts with the 
other disciplines so that designs of future spacecraft systems not only respect human limitations, 
but also benefit fully from human capabilities.  The influence diagram provided in Figure HF-1 
schematizes interrelations with the NESC discipline areas from a human factors viewpoint for 
the different phases of the spacecraft system life cycle, in terms of ground and flight crew 
operations. 
 
 
Figure HF-1.  Human Factors Discipline Influence Diagram 
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2.0 Key DDT&E HFE Attributes that Ensure Robust and Reliable 
Spacecraft Systems 
 
Key attributes that ensure robust and reliable systems can be divided into the attributes of the 
product and the attributes of the processes used to develop and operate the product.   
2.1 Human Factors Product Attributes  
The spacecraft system design products include hardware, software, systems documentation, 
training systems, and procedures.  HFE issues relate to all aspects of the system life, including 
design, build, test, operate and maintain, across the spectrum of operating conditions (nominal, 
contingency, and emergency).  HFE aspects relate to all people who come into contact with the 
spacecraft, including design and construction personnel, pre-launch test and verification 
personnel, and astronauts and ground support personnel. 
 
A robust design is one that addresses three key aspects of HFE: 
 
1. System demands are designed to be compatible with human capabilities.  The tasks demanded 
of people can be performed reliably, under nominal, contingency, and emergency conditions.  
This attribute is supported by the use of HFE design analyses, HFE guidelines and standards, 
and thorough test and evaluation. 
 
2. The system is designed so that human capabilities can be brought to bear on non-routine, 
unanticipated problems.  This is a key attribute that provides system resilience.  The 
intelligent adaptation of humans to novel situations can significantly contribute to mission 
success in the face of situations that were not anticipated when the system was designed and 
evaluated.  In contrast to automated systems, humans possess unparalleled abilities to solve 
problems and deal with unanticipated situations.  A robust system keeps the flight crew and 
other personnel in the loop and enables them to take action when novel situations arise. 
 
3. The system is designed to tolerate and recover from human error.  NPR 8705.2A Section 3.1 
specifies that “space systems shall be designed so that no two failures result in crew or 
passenger fatality or permanent disability.”  The NASA Safety Manual (NASA NPR 8715.3, 
Requirement 25215) also requires sufficient system redundancy to tolerate two failures or two 
human operator errors (fail-safe or fail operational1) when loss of life or mission critical 
events could occur, but permits one-failure (fail-safe) tolerance in cases where the lesser 
consequences of system loss or damage or personal injury could occur.  The two-failure 
tolerance concept is not limited to NASA, and is also referred to in MIL-STD-882D (DoD, 
2000, p.14). 
 
Error tolerance can be achieved in three ways, as specified in NPR 8705.2A, Section 3.1.5: 
 
                                                 
1 From the glossary of NPR 8715.3, “fail-safe” is the ability to sustain a failure and retain the capability to safely 
terminate or control the operation, while “fail-operational” is the ability to sustain a failure and retain full 
operational capability. 
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 (a) Undesired but predictable errors are blocked, such as through the use of interlocks or 
design features that prevent dangerous actions from being carried to completion 
 (b) Errors that are not blocked can be detected and recovered, such as through the ability 
to “undo” erroneous actions.  There must be a means to detect errors and gracefully recover 
from errors when they are made. 
 (c) Undesired deviations that are not blocked, detected, nor are recoverable from, will 
have consequences that are minimized wherever possible.  One way to achieve this is to build 
redundancy (e.g., tolerance to any combination of two failures or inadvertent actions) into the 
system (NPR 8705.2A Section 3.1.3, Requirement 34422). 
 
Table HF-1 lists these three principles of robustness, and provides examples of how they would 
be applied at the design stage to different phases of the system life cycle.  The phases chosen to 
illustrate these principles include the Manufacture, Test, Operate, and Maintain stages of system 
life. 
Table HF-1.  Role of HFE in Design for Reliability/Robustness.  Good practices with 
examples of how these principles can be brought to bear during the design of different 
phases of the system life cycle. 
Design Principle System Life Cycle Phase 
 Manufacture Test Operate Maintain 
System demands are 
compatible with human 
capabilities and 
limitations 
Knowledge, skills 
and abilities 
involved in 
manufacturing can 
be objectively 
defined and 
evaluated.  
Test and verification 
tasks are within 
human perceptual 
envelope.  
Human-system 
interface are 
consistent with 
human performance 
standards 
Maintenance tasks are within 
human capabilities. 
 
System enables 
utilization of human 
capabilities in non-
routine and unpredicted 
situations 
 
 
  System keeps human 
operators in the loop 
and permits humans 
to take control in the 
event of unexpected 
events.2 
If necessary, non-routine 
trouble-shooting and system 
repair is possible. 
System can tolerate and 
recover from human 
errors 
1. Undesired errors are 
blocked 
2. Detect and recover 
from errors 
3. Minimize 
consequences of 
uncorrected errors 
Components designed 
to make incorrect 
assembly difficult 
Provide requirement 
for independent test 
verification 
Appropriate 
interlocks, make it 
difficult to do 
dangerous things 
 
System state is made 
apparent 
 
Avoiding simultaneous 
maintenance of redundant 
systems 
 
                                                 
2 It may be difficult to return control to the human in some situations.  For those situations, a second automated 
system may be essential, built with a different foundational basis so that one type of failure cannot take out both 
systems. 
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2.2 Human Factors Process Attributes 
The following are the key practices of an HFE program to help ensure that NASA’s systems are 
reliable and robust.  
2.2.1 Integrate HFE into the Design Process 
To achieve the key product attributes identified above, HFE should be fully integrated into the 
overall engineering process from the outset as required by NPR 8705.2A (Section 1.6.4.1, 
Requirement 34346).  This will help ensure timely and complete interaction with other 
engineering activities.  Experience has shown that when HFE activities are performed 
independently from other engineering activities, their impact and effectiveness is greatly 
decreased.  Moreover, including HFE at the beginning of a project helps ensure that user needs 
can be addressed early in the design process before changes become too costly.  Often when 
problems are identified late in a design project, corrections reflect “band-aid” fixes rather than 
optimal solutions.  [ref. DDT&E Report, Section 2.1, Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2,] The HFE 
activities described in this document provide the means to accomplish this objective.  
2.2.2  Use a “Top-Down” Hierarchical Approach 
The HFE aspects of a system should be developed, designed, and evaluated on the basis of a 
systems analysis that uses a “top-down” approach.  Top-down refers to an approach starting at 
the “top” of the hierarchy with the system’s high-level mission and goals.  These are divided into 
the functions necessary to achieve the goals.  Functions are allocated to human and system 
resources.  Each function can be broken down into tasks.  The tasks are analyzed to determine 
the cognitive, perceptual, motor, and ergonomic demands placed on human operators and then to 
identify the alarms, displays, procedures, controls, etc. that will be required for task performance.  
Task requirements reflect performance demands imposed by the detailed design of the system.  
Tasks are arranged into meaningful jobs to be performed by personnel who will operate and 
maintain the system.  The interfaces, support systems, procedures, and training are designed to 
best support personnel in performing their tasks.  The detailed design (of the interfaces, support 
systems, procedures, and training) is the “bottom” of the top-down process.  Of course, there are 
also requirements that stem from the detailed design of individual systems and components.  
These are captured when personnel tasks are analyzed. 
2.2.3 Apply HFE throughout the System Life Cycle 
Application of HFE is mandatory for the full life cycle of any human-rated space systems 
program (NPR 8705.2A, Section 1.6.4.1, Requirement 34346).  The life cycle spans concept 
planning through operations, and ultimately decommissioning and disposal.  HFE is sometimes 
thought of as a “usability” check of the final design.  Relegating consideration of user needs to 
final design checking, however, will make design changes difficult and costly to incorporate.  
HFE activities must be performed early on, beginning at the system’s initial planning stages, e.g., 
what should be automated and how much automation to incorporate into the design.  Otherwise, 
it may be too late to compensate. 
2.2.4 Rank the HFE Effort to Focus on the Areas of Greatest Significance 
HFE activities should be ranked.  This means that the design organization should ensure that a 
process is in place to adjust the level of HFE design and evaluation effort to its need in the 
design process.  Such an approach enables the application of HFE to be directed to where it will 
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have the most impact.  Moreover, these points all need to be considered in context which 
requires analysis of the (space) environment, specific operational demands, and the effects on 
human performance. 
 
• For each subsystem, identify how and when humans will interact with the spacecraft 
system during all stages of its life cycle (design, development, assembly, testing, 
operation, and maintenance). 
• Identify scenarios in which human error and human performance variability could 
degrade subsequent system reliability. 
• Critical human activities should be prototyped either in vivo or via computer simulation.  
• Interactions between activities should be identified, attention given to scheduling of 
human activities to avoid temporal, spatial bottlenecks, and conflicts as well as to avoid 
complex multi-task demands at specific during which human performance is known to be 
less than optimal. 
• Rate human reliability threats in terms of probability and criticality. 
• Develop countermeasures.  
• Demonstrate that significant human reliability threats have been addressed at the design 
stage.  Consider these from the standpoint of coupled human-system design, addressing 
hardware/software systems as appropriate. 
 
2.3 Managing the Risk of Human Error (Initial Human Error Hazard 
Analysis) 
Early in the development process, it is critical to identify potential hazards that could originate 
from human error.  Even though the system may be at an early stage of definition, it is possible 
to broadly identify error risks and ensure that these are explicitly considered in design activities.  
As the project progresses through analysis to definition and design, iterative analyses will 
identify potential human errors and human factor risks in progressively finer levels of detail.  
Section 3.6 presents a more comprehensive summary of human error and human reliability 
analysis methods applicable to various aspects of HFE program development and design. 
 
The NASA Safety Manual (NPR 8715.3, Requirement 32126) specifies a Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) will be started early in the project development process.  The initial 
identification of human error risks would most likely be carried out as part of the PHA as a 
human error hazard analysis. 
 
The aims of the initial human error analysis are to: 
 
1. Identify the critical items list (CIL) of system demands that may be incompatible with human 
capabilities. 
 
2. Identify the CIL where the system is vulnerable to human error, particularly where the two-
fault tolerance principle is breached. 
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Given the early stage of system development, the initial human error hazard analysis will be 
characterized by: 
 
• A qualitative rather than an excessively probabilistic approach 
• A broad level of granularity 
 
The initial human error analysis would consider: 
 
• Normal as well as non-normal operations 
• All stages of the system life cycle, from design, build, and operate, to maintain 
 
The initial human error hazard analysis would draw on information from:  
 
• Lessons learned 
• Operational Experience Reviews 
• Incident and accident databases 
• Relevant experience from other industries and settings 
 
Two analysis techniques guide the human error hazard analysis.  
 
1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down approach, starting with a list of potential catastrophic 
scenarios and then working down to identify how these could occur.  During the human error 
analysis, the emphasis is naturally on the human actions that could jeopardize a mission or lead 
to loss of life.  Although probability estimates are commonly inserted into fault trees, even 
without this level of detail fault trees can help the analyst identify situations where the system is 
vulnerable to human error, and particularly where the two-error tolerance principle has been 
breached. 
 
2. Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HFPFMEA) is a bottom-up 
approach that identifies:  how people interact with human/machine interfaces; what errors are 
possible; and what consequences would result.  Information from fault tree analyses, as well as 
preliminary function analysis and task analysis assists in the HFPFMEA process (JSC, 2002).  
 
The two approaches of FTA and HFPFMEA are complimentary and information from one 
approach is used to refine and guide the other.   The relation between the two approaches is 
depicted schematically in Figure HF-2. 
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Figure HF-2.  Preliminary Hazard Analysis:  Human Error Hazard Analysis 
3.0 Human Factors Engineering Activities 
 
This section describes the HFE activities that should be performed to support human reliability.  
These activities, listed in Figure HF-3, provide the means of implementing the key attributes 
identified in Section 5.2.  Figure HF-3 represents the relative timing of HFE activities with 
respect to the system design stages.  Figure HF-3 indicates that a number of activities can occur 
in parallel and shows that the intensity of effort associated with each activity grows and 
diminishes through the course of the DDT&E program.   
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Figure HF-3.  HFE Activities as Part of the Design Program 
 
The intent of Figure HF-3 is solely to represent the relative phasing and intensities of HFE 
activities in a general program.  This figure, however, does not illustrate any of the interactions 
between the eleven different activities.  In practice, such interactions could link any one activity 
with many different combinations of the other listed HFE activities.  Moreover, these 
combinations could be expected to change with successive iterations during the entire program 
life cycle.  Most significantly, the precise details of phasing and intensities of activities will of 
course vary between one development program and another.   
 
The human factors and human reliability disciplines not only levy requirements [e.g., Human 
Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR)] on space system design, HFE experience and human 
performance capabilities inform and help define mission and vehicle design goals as part of 
overall SE process.  Consequently, early HFE activities should be integrated with, and conducted 
in concert with, early SE activities.  Figure 2.3-3, Iterative Risk Based System Design Loop, in 
the SE Section of the DDT&E Report (Dec 2006) is augmented to indicate the key part that HFE 
needs to play from the program outset.  As shown in Figure HF-4, HFE not only has a role in 
reliability analyses, HFE establishes a portion of the requirements for the spacecraft program 
(HSIR and Constellation Architecture Requirements Document, CARD).  HFE also helps SE 
define operations concepts and needs (Mission Operations Directorate).  Moreover, HFE helps 
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delimit permissible physics for the spacecraft system—the crew will need not only to survive the 
physics of the space environment but perform well enough to ensure mission success.  Finally, 
HFE affords a more comprehensive reliability analysis because human operators (crew and 
ground) are part of the space system. 
 
 
 
Figure HF-4.  Integration of HFE in the Iterative Risk-Based System Design Loop.  HFE 
contributions (yellow ovals) point to specific Systems Engineering activities to which they 
must be linked. 
 
It is important to note that human performance can be quite sensitive to seemingly minor aspects 
of a system's design.  For example, like many complex systems, a spacecraft has a large 
information system that the flight crew access through a small number of cockpit video display 
units.  The crew accesses this information using features provided by the human-system interface 
(HSI), such as menus or links.  When these features are poorly designed, the workload associated 
with accessing information increases and pilots will be reluctant to access needed information, 
especially during an emergency, when workload management is already an issue.  However, this 
sets up a situation where the failure to access all the information needed impairs the crew’s 
situation awareness leading them to misdiagnose the situation or take an incorrect action.  Thus, 
supporting human reliability requires careful attention to all of the HFE activities discussed in 
this chapter. 
 
Each of the activities listed in Figure HF-3 is described in its own subsection below.  The 
description in each subsection addresses three aspects of the particular activity:  
 
• its purpose and objectives 
• the key methodological elements of the activity 
• sources of additional information 
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Key methodological elements described here can be used to evaluate a proposed design program 
across all Constellation (e.g. CEV, LSAM) systems.  The design program should describe how 
these activities and their key methodological elements are addressed.  This information can also 
be used to assess the design itself.  Two additional considerations should be noted.  First, the 
terminology used in this chapter generally conforms to typical use in SE.  However, a specific 
design and development program may use different language when describing the same 
activities.  This is completely acceptable.  It is important that the design program accomplishes 
the objectives regardless of the terminology used.   
 
Second, design is an iterative process.  While the activities are presented below in serial fashion, 
the reader should recognize that many of the activities described below will be performed 
throughout the course of the design and development program and will occur in parallel with 
each other.  Thus for example, there may be a preliminary allocation of function before any 
analysis work begins, e.g., as part of a procurement specification.  However, the allocation will 
be analyzed further as part of that HFE activity to better specify the basis for allocating 
functions.  The function allocation may be revised across the design process as the design 
becomes more detailed and evaluations of system performance are made.   
 
3.1   HFE Program Planning 
This activity involves planning for the HFE aspects of a design and development program.  This 
includes identifying (1) the general HFE program goals and scope, (2) high-level concept of 
operations for the new system, (3) HFE design team skills necessary to conduct subsequent HFE 
activities (responsibilities of the main design team and contractors should be clearly stated), (4) 
engineering procedures (such as quality assurance and the use of an issues tracking system) to be 
followed, (5) description of HFE products and documentation of analysis and results, and (6) key 
milestones and scheduled to ensure the timely completion of HFE products.  The results of the 
planning activity should be documented in a human factors program plan that can be used to 
manage the overall HFE effort.  
 
Additional information on HFE Program Planning can be found in the following sources: 
 
NPR 8705.2A Sec 1.6.4.1 (Requirement 34346) 
NPR 7120.5C Sec 3.2.1.2d  
MIL-HDBK-46855 
O’Hara et al. (2004) NUREG-0711 
O’Hara et al. (2005) EPRI 
  
3.2   Operating Experience Review and Lessons Learned 
New design projects should be based on a thorough understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing designs that are similar and of the new technology that will be used.  
Operating experience reviews (OERs) help provide this information.  OERs should be held 
periodically during the project/program cycle, as designs change, operations change, or other 
developments occur.  OERs should be implemented as a series, first as a stand-alone, and then 
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subsequent ones as an element of the existing design review cycle.  Each OER is performed to 
understand (1) current or planned work practices so the potential impact of planned changes, 
such as the introduction of new systems and new responsibilities and tasks or the introduction of 
new performance schedules, can be assessed, (2) operational problems and issues may be 
addressed in a new design or modification of an existing design, and (3) relevant domain 
experience with candidate system technology approaches.  
 
Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  The OER and lessons learned activity should identify positive as well as negative 
experiences.  In essence, the best place to start a design project is by understanding the 
lessons learned for similar systems in the past.  With respect to HFE, similarity in terms of 
overall mission of the system and of anticipated HSI designs should be considered.   
 
2. A variety of data sources can be used, including: available documentation, including 
databases and event reports and summaries3, interviews, and walkthroughs with personnel, 
and communications with other facilities and organizations. 
 
3. OER information items that are identified should be prioritized by the design organization.  
Since OER information is useful only if it is available to the members of the design team 
who can make use of the information, it is desirable to classify the information according to 
design topics for which it is relevant, e.g., automation, procedures, and training.  Finally, 
items should be prioritized based on their importance to mission success and human 
performance. 
 
4. The OER and lessons learned information should be documented to provide a clear 
indication of the issue identified, the design activities to which it is relevant, and its 
importance.  The OER should be maintained and readily accessible to the design team. 
 
5. The identification of operating experience and the lessons learned from it should be an 
ongoing activity throughout the design project.  
 
Additional information on OER can be found in the following sources: 
 
NASA Lessons Learned Information System searchable database 
(http://nen.nasa.gov/portal/site/llis) 
EPRI (2005) 
O’Hara et al. (2004) NUREG-0711 
                                                 
3 A frequent problem encountered when utilizing existing experience databases and event reports is the lack of 
human performance-related information.  For example, the Aerospace Corporation Space Systems Engineering 
database employed by the Systems Engineering Discipline (DDT&E Report, Systems Engineering, Section 1.2) 
provided negligible detail on the few human performance related system failures reported.  Another factor is that 
even when human related failures are reported, the descriptions are not specific, often using a “catch-all” phrase 
such as “workmanship” to describe process and implementation failures, e.g., DDT&E Report Section 2.0 (SE), 
Figure 1.2-3.  HFE practitioners should strive to improve experience-capturing databases by including fields that 
will support the development of HFE lessons learned.  See also Section 4.2.1.     
 17 of 47  
3.3   Function Analysis and Allocation 
Every spacecraft system has one or more missions that it is designed to achieve.  To achieve a 
mission, various functions have to be performed, such as GN&C and life support.  The term 
function allocation, as used here, simply refers to the allocation of responsibility for conducting 
functions, or parts of functions, to personnel (flight and ground crew), to automatic systems, or 
to some combination of the two.  In some cases, the best way may be to flexibly allocate 
functions so they can be performed either by the crew or automatically depending dynamically 
on the crew’s goals and priorities in the current situation.  The allocation is made on the basis of 
a function analysis to determine what is required to perform the function.  Using the results of 
the function analysis, responsibility is allocated in a way that best ensures overall 
accomplishment of the function. 
 
As functions are analyzed, their requirements become better defined.  At some point, those 
functions or parts of a function are assigned to the available resources, which include hardware, 
software, and human elements (and, of course, combinations of them).  The overall purpose of 
function analysis and allocation is to ensure that functional requirements are sufficiently defined 
and analyzed so that the allocation of functions to the available resources can take advantage of 
the strengths of each.  In other words, make use of automation and human capabilities in ways 
that maximize overall function accomplishment.  
 
Decisions about automation are very much intertwined with the role of personnel in operations 
and the specific responsibilities personnel will have in accomplishing system functions.  Flight 
and ground crew performance is essential to overall system performance, reliability, and safety.  
Therefore design decisions that have a negative impact on human performance can ultimately 
compromise spacecraft system performance.  The most significant negative impacts on flight 
crew and other personnel of poorly designed automation are: 
 
• Loss of situational awareness – greater degrees of automation can often result in a loss of 
situational awareness, or at least greater difficulty in gaining situation awareness. 
• Loss of vigilance due to trust and complacency – when personnel come to trust the 
automation, they can become complacent and less vigilant in monitoring the system’s 
performance.  Personnel will thus become less likely to intervene when they should. 
• Workload extremes – greater automation is often associated with lower workload 
(sometimes to the point of boredom).  This can happen when the automation is 
functioning properly or when periods of extreme workload occur during an automation 
failure and personnel must intervene. 
• Degradation of skills – since automatic systems are usually reliable, human performance 
of the function is rare and personnel skills for performing the actions are degraded over 
time.  Also, it should be noted that human performance capabilities fluctuate across time 
as a function of physiologically based circadian influences. 
 
Thus, the objective of this analysis is to specify the roles and responsibilities of personnel and 
automation in the performance of system functions, including how they may be changed as a 
result of various types of failure conditions.  
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Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  Conduct Function Analysis - The first step is to define the functions needed for the mission 
and the available trade space that include:  (1) determine the objectives, performance 
requirements, and constraints of the design, such as required speed, accuracy, reliability, etc.; 
(2) define the activities that must be accomplished to meet the objectives and required 
performance; (3) define the relationships between functions and subsystems (e.g., 
configurations or success paths) responsible for performing the functions; and (4) define 
trade-off priorities and constraints.  Function characterization includes:   
 
• Purpose of the function  
• Cues indicating that the function is required 
• Cues indicating that the function is available (the subsystems/means of performing the 
function that are available) 
• Actions needed to perform the function 
• Time and performance requirements and constraints for performing the function 
• Information that indicates the function is operating (the subsystem/means of performing 
the function are operating) 
• Information that indicates the function is achieving its purpose  
• Information that indicates that operation of the function can or should be terminated 
• Potential failures of the function and alternative means for function attainment 
• Cues to identify each of the postulated failures 
 
The level of description of the characterization begins at a general level and becomes better 
defined as the design details emerge. 
 
2.  Define Scenarios for Evaluation – As the demands on personnel are not constant across 
different operations, events, and situations, several scenarios should be identified for use in 
the evaluation.  Each scenario is likely to involve multiple functions.  A sufficient number of 
scenarios should be developed to provide a basis to evaluate all the functions for which 
allocation is to be examined. 
 
3.  Conduct Function Allocation Evaluation – This analysis is performed for each scenario.  As 
the whole function analysis and allocation process is iterative, this analysis can begin at the 
earliest design stages.  Allocations can be refined or adjusted as more information about 
performance is known and evaluations are conducted.  Information supporting this evaluation 
includes: 
 
• Estimated function performance requirements as determined from function analysis, such 
as speed, accuracy, reliability, and workload 
• Capabilities and limitations of personnel and hardware/software 
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• Prior operational experience; i.e., knowledge of which allocations have been problematic 
and which have been successful are considered as a basis for allocation 
• Results of tests and evaluations 
 
To make these allocations, the following should be assessed. 
 
Identify Mandatory Function Allocations – Consider first whether an allocation is mandatory as 
required by regulations (e.g., NPR8705.2A Sections 3.2 and 3.3), NASA policy, or accepted 
practice. 
 
Identify Functions that are Central to the Human Role – Certain functions are central to the 
human role based on the desired concept of operations.  The strong preference is for these 
functions to be performed by personnel.  If a function is not central to the human role, it may be 
advisable to automate it so that its performance does not interfere with functions that are central 
to that role. 
 
Identify Function Characteristics that Indicate Automation is Essential – Evaluate function 
characteristics to determine whether automation is essential, e.g., where it can be expected that 
the demands exceed human capabilities.  Specifically, automation should be considered for any 
function having these requirements and characteristics: 
 
• Manual performance of the function raises health and safety concerns 
• The function has to be performed very rapidly  
• The function requires precision that exceeds human capabilities 
• The required performance reliability exceeds typical human reliability 
 
Next, it must be determined whether it is technically feasible to automate the task, and if so, 
whether it is cost effective.  Even when automated, there may be reasons to design in some level 
of human involvement, e.g.:  
 
• The function is a core human responsibility 
• There are situations where circumstances could make the automatic response 
inappropriate 
• It is desirable to keep personnel “in the loop” in the event that they have to take over 
control 
• It is important to keep personnel involved to support their other functional responsibilities  
• Human involvement is a deliberate choice to require attention and effort from personnel 
in order to preclude boredom 
 
If none of these reasons exists and it is cost-effective to do so, then full automation is 
recommended.  Note that this does not mean personnel will not have to be aware of the 
automatic actions.  If some human involvement is warranted, then some of the basic activities 
needed to perform the function should be designed for partial automation. 
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In the paragraphs immediately above, functions that are central to the human role were 
considered, but also have characteristics indicating that automation is essential.  However, if 
automation is not essential, the next consideration should be whether the function has 
characteristics indicating some automation is warranted (e.g., where automation is not essential, 
but the characteristics challenge human performance).  Specifically, some automation support 
should be considered for any functions having the following characteristics: 
 
• Very complex to perform 
• Requires many repetitive actions (such actions can produce fatigue and boredom that can 
negatively impact human performance) 
• Creates high cognitive workload 
• Creates long periods of boredom 
• Must be performed during physiological circadian low points 
• Creates high physical workload or fatigue 
• Performance of the function interferes with performance of another function 
 
When these characteristics exist, full manual performance may be error prone, thus some support 
should be developed.  If it is both feasible and cost effective to automate, then automating parts 
of the function should be considered.  Where it is not feasible or cost effective to automate, then 
the function should be performed manually and task supports should be developed to assist 
personnel performance. 
 
When automation is desirable or essential, but is not feasible, the need for the function to be 
performed must be reconsidered.  Similarly, if necessary task support is very complex, the task 
should be reconsidered. 
 
4.  Evaluate Allocations across Scenarios – As noted above, the demands on personnel may not 
be constant across different scenarios.  When the same allocation result is obtained across 
scenarios, then a static allocation can be designed.  That is, the function will always be 
manual, fully automatic, partially automatic, or manual with task support.  When the 
allocations change across scenarios, the functions are candidates for dynamic allocation; e.g., 
performed manually in some situations and automatically in others.  
 
5.  Evaluate Overall Personnel Role – It is important to evaluate the net effect of all human 
allocations to ensure that a logical and coherent role for personnel has been defined and that 
it is within acceptable workload levels. 
 
6.  Verify Allocations – Verification of the acceptability of the allocations is a continuous and 
ongoing process.  While initially qualitative evaluations as discussed here are necessary, 
allocation acceptability is continuously evaluated as part of later design activities.  When 
mockups, simulators, and other tools become available, function allocations can be evaluated 
by measuring actual performance. 
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Additional information on Functional Requirements Analysis and Allocation can be found in the 
following source(s): 
 
Billings (1997) 
DoD (1998) 
EPRI (2005) 
O’Hara et al. (2004) 
3.4   Task Analysis 
To accomplish their assigned functions, personnel must perform tasks.  Generally, the term 
“task” is used to refer to a group of activities that have a common purpose.  The objective of task 
analysis is to specify the requirements for successful task performance, e.g., what alarms, 
information, controls, communications, and procedures are needed.  
 
Task analysis is actually a family of techniques.  For example, Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) list 
over 40 tasks analysis techniques.  A single technique is not adequate for all situations because 
tasks can be very different from one another.  Some tasks are sequential and well defined, like 
starting a system.  Other tasks are ill defined and not sequential, like fault-detection and 
troubleshooting.  Different task analysis methods are better suited to different tasks.  For 
example, Link Analysis is a method of analyzing the layout of equipment and consoles based on 
task demands.  Operational Sequence Analysis is a method of examining the detailed behavioral 
aspects of tasks that are fairly well defined and sequential.  Hierarchical Task Analysis is a 
method of decomposing higher-level functions to the information and controls that personnel 
need to perform their tasks.  Cognitive Task Analysis is a method for analyzing the diagnosis and 
decision-making process and is best suited to examining tasks that are very ill defined and very 
dependent on the expertise of the user.  In combination, these methods provide powerful tools for 
identifying task requirements.  
 
While the specific methodology depends on the type of task analysis performed, some of the key 
methodological elements are outlined below: 
 
1.  Select Tasks to Analyze – It may not be necessary to perform task analysis on all tasks.  For 
example, if a system function is well known and essentially unchanged from predecessor 
systems, it may not be necessary to reanalyze it.  Other tasks should be analyzed. 
 
2.  Develop High-Level Task Descriptions – Once the tasks to analyze are selected, the actual 
task analysis is a matter of developing a high-level task description and decomposing a high-
level description to a level of detail precise enough to identify the requirements for 
performance.  Thus, task analysis is a continuation of the process of hierarchical 
decomposition that began in function analysis.  The basic elements of a task description are: 
 
• Purpose – The reason a task is performed (usually to accomplish a function or higher-
level element in a functional decomposition). 
• Task Initiation – The conditions, events, or situations that indicate that it is time to 
perform the task.  
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• Preconditions – The initial conditions that must be met before a task can be undertaken 
(including role of interlocks).   
• Time – The time constraints, if any, on task performance: time available for the action 
and time required to do it.  
• Task Termination – The conditions, events, or situations that indicate that it is time to 
stop the task.  
• Failures – Things that can go wrong, identifying cues and alternative actions.  
 
The actual starting point for the analysis depends on what information is already available.  
Existing system documentation and analyses, subject matter experts, operational procedures, 
discussions with personnel, walkthroughs, and evaluations are all potential sources of 
information for task analysis. 
 
3.  Develop Detailed Task Descriptions – Developing detailed task descriptions involves the 
following steps: 
 
• Further decomposition of tasks from high-level to low-level descriptions 
• Evaluating the completeness of the task decomposition 
• Identifying the relationship between task elements (such as which tasks are sequential 
and which have to be performed in parallel) 
• Developing a timeline if time-criticality or workload problems are suspected 
• Identifying additional considerations as needed 
 
4.  Identify Task Requirements – Once the task is decomposed to a sufficient level of detail, the 
specific requirements for personnel to properly perform the task should be identified.  The 
categories of task requirements are identified in Table HF-2.  These requirements are a major 
input to HSI, procedure, and training design.  All of the items listed in Table HF-2 are not 
necessarily needed in every task analysis. 
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Table HF-2.  General Task Requirements Considerations 
Categories of 
Requirements Examples 
Information Requirements • Parameter values (units, precision, and accuracy) 
• Display format (analog format device, numerical readout, 
binary status indicator) 
• Parameter trends (e.g., rate of change, direction of 
change) 
• Parameter limits (e.g., normal ranges, hi/lo alarm limits) 
• System or equipment state (e.g., operating state, 
availability) 
• Cautions/warnings 
• Feedback required to indicate adequacy of task 
performance 
• Task-related alarms 
Decision-making 
Requirements 
• Evaluations to be performed by user 
• Criteria for making decision 
• Risks associated with making a wrong decision 
Response Requirements • Type of action to be taken 
• Time available and temporal constraints 
• Accuracy needed 
• Frequency 
• Reach and movements needed to take an action 
• Alternate means of accomplishing the action (e.g., 
backup controls) 
Communication 
Requirements 
• Personnel communication (such as for trouble shooting 
or when multiple users work on the system) 
• Human-machine communication demands 
Workload  • Physical, cognitive, overlap of tasks (serial versus 
parallel versus concurrent tasks) 
Task Support Requirements • Special and protective clothing  
• Special tools 
• Job aids or reference materials required 
Workplace Factors • Workspace envelope required by action taken 
• Typical and extreme environmental conditions, such as 
lighting, temp, noise 
 
It is crucial that the task analysis for any one function/subsystem be conducted in the context of 
the overall set of tasks that must be performed in the same timeframe.  Designs that may be 
completely adequate if the operator has no other tasks may be dangerously inadequate in the 
presence of competing task demands. 
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Task analysis provides detailed information about what is needed to perform tasks.  This 
information has many uses in subsequent analyses, including: staffing, error analysis, HSI and 
procedure design, training, and verification and validation (V&V). 
 
Additional information on Task Analysis can be found in the following sources: 
 
Crandall et al. (2006) 
Diaper (2004) 
DoD (1998) 
EPRI (2005) 
Kirwan & Ainsworth (1992)  
O’Hara et al (2004) 
Shraagen et al. (2000) 
Vicente (1999) 
3.5 Staffing, Qualifications, and Integrated Work Design 
In the task analysis discussed above, the requirements for performance of human task 
responsibilities were determined.  The objective of this activity is to determine how those tasks 
should be assigned to crewmembers and what overall staffing levels are required. In particular, 
the analysis is intended to accomplish the following: (1) allocate human tasks to individual 
crewmembers; (2) evaluate the qualifications needed for crewmember positions to accomplish 
their assigned tasks; and (3) evaluate the overall impact of all tasks when they are considered in 
an integrated fashion.  Note that the term “crewmember” here encompasses both flight crew and 
ground personnel. 
 
Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  Assign Tasks to Crewmembers – Tasks need to be assigned to individual crewmembers.  The 
main considerations in assigning tasks are the general areas of responsibility defined by 
current practices (workload is also important and will be addressed in the next method 
element).  It is important from a human performance standpoint, to keep the task 
responsibilities of crewmembers related to each other.  Assigning tasks on the basis of their 
relationship to general areas of responsibility supports situation assessment and awareness.  
When a crewmember works on related tasks, it is easier to maintain focus on the area of 
responsibility.  Conversely, when a crewmember is assigned an ad hoc group of unrelated 
tasks, the demands associated with shifting attention between tasks detracts from maintaining 
situational awareness and the ability to properly monitor status and detect deviations. 
 
2.  Evaluate Integrated Task Demands and Staffing Levels – Crewmember responsibilities are 
defined as the complete set of tasks that the crewmember is expected to perform.  The focus 
of this analysis is to examine the impact of task assignments on these responsibilities.  A key 
consideration involves workload.  Workload should be assessed and task assignments revised 
if workload is too high or low.  NPR 8705.2A Section 3.4 addresses requirements for flight 
and ground crew workload.  Also, fatigue from extended work periods and human circadian 
factors must be considered since reaction time and cognition are known to change as a 
function of the 24-hour body clock.  The evaluation of integrated task demands can use 
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several methodologies.  First, a tabletop assessment can be made by talking through the 
tasks.  Task descriptions and detailed task analyses should be available to support the 
evaluation.  Another way of performing this evaluation is to have crewmembers go though 
scenarios using simulators, mockups, and prototypes. 
 
3.  Evaluate Teamwork – In most complex systems, crewmembers work as teams. Behaviors that 
are typically identified as important elements of teamwork include having common and 
coordinated goals, maintaining shared situational awareness, engaging in open 
communication, and cooperative planning.  Members of successful teams monitor the status 
of others, back each other up, actively identify errors, and question improper procedures.  
The allocation of individual tasks or a change in the overall responsibilities of individual 
crewmembers can impact teamwork.  Thus this potential effect should be evaluated using 
operations and training experts, following the evaluation of integrated task demands.   
 
Another important consideration is new HSI technology.  An often unintended and unanticipated 
impact of technology, such as the introduction of intelligent agents, is its effect on 
crewmember’s responsibilities and team processes. 
 
4.  Evaluate Staff Qualifications – Personnel will require specific knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSAs) in order to perform their assigned task.  The staffing and task analyses should be 
evaluated by operations and training experts to identify the needed KSAs for each 
crewmember. 
 
Additional information on Staffing, Qualifications, and Integrated Work Design can be found in 
the following sources: 
 
DoD (1998) 
EPRI (2005) 
O’Hara et al. (2004) 
3.6   Human Error, Reliability Analysis, and Risk Assessment 
This activity is performed to evaluate the potential for, and mechanisms of, human error in 
system operation and maintenance.  Human error analysis can be performed for any number of 
reasons related to the optimization of training, performance, equipment design and safety.  
Human reliability analysis (HRA) implies a systems model where in conjunction with equipment 
reliability considerations, the probability of human failure is determined for risk-significant 
actions and decisions.  When performing either human error analysis or human reliability 
analysis, significant personnel tasks including aspects of human-system interaction described 
earlier in this chapter will be analyzed in detail such that the circumstances and conditions 
surrounding them are sufficiently understood to allow for the identification and implementation 
of error-tolerant design strategies (minimize personnel errors, allow their detection, and provide 
recovery capability).  These insights can be applied to manage the potential for errors through the 
design of the HSIs, procedures, training, and automation.  Significant tasks are those that impact 
mission success, the safety of system operations, and where personnel safety is an issue.  For 
example, when considering significant tasks for in-flight operations, any errors that have the 
potential to contribute to loss of mission or loss of crew would be analyzed and the means to 
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make current designs error-tolerant identified.  NPR 8702.5A (Section 1.6.2.3, Requirement 
34399) requires the Program Manager “develop systems engineering models, compatible with 
the risk model developed ... to estimate and allocate component, subsystem, and human 
reliability values throughout the development and operation of the system.”  For a review of 
current HRA methods with potential applicability for CEV, see Chandler et al. (2006). 
 
Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  Identify Personnel Tasks to Analyze – When analyzing complex systems, detailed error 
analysis of all personnel actions is not feasible.  Therefore, it is typically necessary to 
develop screening criteria to select the actions to evaluate.  There are several approaches that 
can be used.  First, the task analysis conducted should have had an assessment of task 
failures.  This can provide input to identify significant human actions.  Second, qualitative 
information can be obtained from subject matter experts and system personnel to identify 
important tasks.  Third, failure analysis techniques, such as HFPFMEA can be used to 
systematically assess the potential for human task failures.  Finally, formal risk models, such 
as PRA, also called Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), can be used to quantitatively 
identify the effect of human task failure on measure of system risk. HRA is the term used to 
describe the human factors analysis to determine the probability of human error of tasks 
modeled in the PRA.  
 
An overview of the HRA process can be found in Systematic Human Action Reliability 
Procedure (SHARP) (EPRI 1999) and in IEEE STD 1082 (IEEE 1997).  These procedures help 
the HRA analyst to determine specific significant risk events.  As part of this process models are 
developed that include human and machine components represented in fault trees.  Failure 
probabilities are determined for equipment- and human-related events.  Recently, in NUREG 
1792 (2006), the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided an overview of good 
practices for HRA that can be used as overall guidance.  Generally speaking, HRA analyses 
should be tailored to the level of the overall analysis, should address dependency, uncertainty, 
and performance shaping factors, should be based upon a generally accepted error taxonomy, 
and should reference an underlying model of human performance.  A benefit of the use of risk 
models is that they provide the capability to perform sensitivity analyses to determine the relative 
importance of various human and machine failures, in isolation or in combination.   
 
2.  Augment Task Descriptions – Once important personnel tasks are identified, they are 
analyzed in detail, with a focus on error-forcing situations and contexts.  An error-forcing 
context represents the combined effect of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and system 
conditions that create a situation in which the probability of human error is high.  Generally, 
PSFs are factors that influence human performance including such things as the availability 
of procedures, time available to perform, task complexity, training, HSI design features, and 
stress.  For non-ground based operations, such as EVA, influencing factors associated with 
bioastronautics should also be identified. 
 
The tasks descriptions developed in task analyses can be used as the starting place for this 
analysis.  The descriptions should be augmented with details concerning how error might occur, 
circumstances that predispose toward (or mitigate against) errors, and pertinent characteristics of 
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the HSI, if available at the time of the analysis.  Augmenting the task descriptions will require 
subject matter experts; at a minimum, personnel who are expected to perform the tasks should be 
consulted.  Table HF-3 contains examples of the questions that can be asked of personnel in the 
course of reviewing or talking through the task to be analyzed. 
 
Table HF-3.  Sample Questions for Human Error Analysis 
• Are there any reasonable and credible adverse conditions, occurring 
either coincidentally with the event or in a casual relationship to it 
(e.g. a loss of some instrumentation due to a senor failure) which 
could affect the level of performance significantly?  
• How stressful do you think the scenario would be for the operating 
team? Have you been in any events like this one, or in any other 
emergencies/abnormalities? Would you anticipate this being more or 
less stressful? 
• What do you believe would be the most credible way in which this 
task could fail? 
• Can you think of any errors or unintended actions that could delay 
the task’s completion or jeopardize it entirely? 
• Are there any problems if this task is interrupted prior to 
completion? 
• Are there any steps in performing the task that may be confusing, 
and in which errors may occur? 
• Is adequate and understandable information available at each step of 
the task to support decision-making and selection of appropriate 
response actions? 
• Is access to any control, or possible confusion between different 
controls, a possible problem that could cause an error? 
• Is task execution either dependent upon or subject to influence from 
different organizations such as task sharing between the flight crew 
and Mission Control?  If so, what is the resource allocation? 
 
3.  Identify Potential Errors and Management Approaches – Once the human error considerations 
have been added to the selected tasks descriptions, the tasks should be reviewed to explicitly 
identify potential errors and changes to the task that might reduce the likelihood of errors or 
mitigate their consequences.   
 
Finally, it is noted that human performance variability is a well-recognized threat to the 
reliability of all systems that require humans to perform critical tasks.  Experience in a range of 
industries such as nuclear power and aviation has demonstrated that for continued system 
reliability, it is necessary to have a non-punitive incident reporting system that focuses on human 
error.  For such as system to function, personnel must be encouraged to report errors and other 
operational problems, and the reported incidents must be analyzed to identify necessary 
corrective actions.  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (NASA CAIB, 2003) noted that 
NASA has historically had difficulty making use of incident data. 
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Additional information on Human Error and Reliability Analysis can be found in the following 
sources. 
 
NPR 8705.2A, Appendix C.6.7 
NPR 7120.5C Sec 3.2.5.2d 
NPR 8000.4 
NASA/OSMA Technical Report (December 2006) Human Reliability Analysis Methods 
Selection Guidance for NASA 
DoD (1998) MIL-H-46855B 
EPRI (1999) SHARP1 
EPRI (2005) 
Fields et al. (1997) 
Forester et al. (2006) 
Gertman & Blackman (1994) 
Hollnagel (1998) 
IEEE STD 1082 (1997) Human Action Reliability Procedure  
JSC 29867 (2002) 
Kirwan, B. (1994) 
Kolaczkowski et al. (2005)  
O’Hara et al (2004) 
Reason, J. (1990)  
Woods, et al. (1994)  
3.7  Human-System Interface and Procedure Design 
NPR8705.2A Section 3.2 requires that the crew of space systems be provided with interfaces to 
monitor and control critical functions as well as receive feedback for all commands for critical 
functions.  Similar requirements for Ground Control are found in NPR8705.2A Section 3.3.  The 
HSI provides the resources needed by personnel to interact with the systems.  HSIs include 
alarms, displays, controls, decision support aids, and their integration into workstations and 
control centers.  HSI also includes elements of the system with which personnel (beyond flight 
crew) interact during construction, test and maintenance, such as connectors, fasteners and test 
systems.  A well-designed HSI has the characteristics outlined in Table HF-4. 
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Table HF-4.  General Characteristics of a Well-Designed HSI 
Accurately represents the system 
Meets user expectations 
Supports situation awareness and crew task performance 
Minimizes secondary tasks and distractions 
Balances workload 
Is compatible with users’ cognitive and physical characteristics 
Is tolerant to error  
Is simple to use (simplest design possible) 
Is standardized and consistent throughout 
Provides information and feedback in a timely way 
Provides a means to obtain explanations where needed  
Provides guidance and help 
Provides appropriate flexibility so it can be adapted to unique 
situations and personal preferences 
 
 
Key methodological elements are: 
 
1. Identify HFE Design Requirements – The analyses discussed in previous sections result in 
requirements for the HSI and procedures.  For example, the staffing analysis identified the 
crew size and the roles and responsibilities of various crewmembers.  The task analyses 
identify the detailed requirements for performing tasks.  Human error analysis identifies 
requirements where error tolerance is needed.   
 
There are other requirements for designing the workspace and environment based on the overall 
concept of operations, e.g., shirt-sleeve versus extravehicular activity (EVA) pressure suit 
environment.  Other engineering requirements exist that also impact the design of the HSI, such 
as available space, anticipated power, etc.  Together, these requirements provide a framework 
within which the HSIs can be designed. 
 
Human factors standards such as MIL STD 1472 and NASA STD 3000 specify good practices 
for the design of equipment, not only for operability but also for maintainability.  Examples of 
good practices for maintainability are given in Table HF-5. 
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Table HF-5.  Examples of Good Practices for Equipment Design 
Equipment that has the same form and function shall be interchangeable throughout a system and 
related systems.  If equipment is not interchangeable functionally, it shall not be interchangeable 
physically. 
 MIL STD 1472 5.9.1.7 
 
Connectors serving the same or similar functions shall be designed to preclude mismatching 
and/or misalignment. 
 MIL STD 1472 5.9.1.7 
 
Susceptibility to abuse.  Cables shall be routed or protected to preclude mechanical damage and 
abuse, including damage by doors, lids, use as steps or hand holds, or being bent or twisted 
sharply or repeatedly.  
 MIL STD 1472 5.9.13.6   
 
 
2. Develop and Select Concept Design – Alternative ways of meeting the requirements should 
be identified or developed.  The reason that alternatives are recommended in this guidance is 
that they provide an opportunity to explore tradeoffs between different approaches.  
Evaluating alternative designs and getting personnel feedback on them can help the 
identification of the best solution.  Evaluation methods can include: 
 
• trade-off evaluations 
• personnel opinions and usability evaluations 
• performance-based tests and evaluations 
 
3. Style Guide Development – Once a concept design is selected, a style guide is developed. A 
system-specific style guide defines the detailed characteristics and functions of the HSI 
elements.  HSI design guidance exists at different levels of specificity.  Industry guidelines 
and standards, such as NASA-STD-3000 (and its successors for the Constellation program), 
generally provide high-level guidance.  However, high-level guidance cannot be used as is 
for design.  The guidance must be made more specific and precise, which is the role of a style 
guide.  A style guide provides detailed specifications or rules that describe the characteristics 
and functions of a specific system’s HSI, such as overall cockpit layout, display screen 
organization, the way system features and functions are presented to personnel, display 
navigational features and functions, and specific design features such as display fonts and use 
of color.  Thus, for example, a general HSI guideline may state the “A standard display 
screen organization should be evident for the location of various HSI functions (such as a 
data display zone, control zone, or message zone) from one display to another” (NRC, 2002, 
guideline 1.5-1).  A system-specific style guide can implement this guideline as follows:  
“Each screen will be divided into four zones: an upper zone providing label and identifying 
information; a left zone providing navigation controls; a lower zone providing alarm, status, 
and message information; and a large center zone displaying user selected information.”   
 
Use of a style guide leads to consistency across the HSI design, even though the design may be 
developed by different design teams.  In addition, use of HFE guidelines helps the design to be 
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compatible with human physiological and cognitive characteristics.  Users bring their 
physiological and cognitive characteristics to their interaction with HSIs. The HSI must 
accommodate human visual, auditory, and haptic perception, information processing 
characteristics, physical size, and strength.  Fortunately, the design engineers do not have to 
determine these characteristics for each project.  Many physiological and cognitive 
characteristics that are important to HSI design are already reflected in the HFE guidelines.   
 
4. Detailed Design – With the selected concept design and style guide, the detailed design of the 
HSIs and procedures can be completed.  There are usually additional considerations that have 
to be addressed in the detailed design, such as: 
• Differing levels of automation 
• Supporting teamwork 
• Long-Term HSI use  
• HSI use under varying environmental conditions  
• HSI test, inspect, and maintenance  
• Coping with HSI and instrumentation and control degradation and failure 
 
Designing for error tolerance is a significant consideration in detailed design.  This means 
designing HSIs to: 
• minimize the occurrence of user errors 
• provide a means for users to detect errors when they are made 
• provide means to gracefully correct errors 
 
While it is a good practice to make HSIs tolerant to all errors, it is especially significant when 
addressing important human tasks—i.e., those with potentially significant impact on mission 
success, safety, and equipment and personnel protection.  
  
The first step is to ensure that a complete HFE analysis exists.  Designing for error tolerance 
begins with the earlier HFE analyses, specifically: 
• identification of operating experience related to the important human action 
• consideration of the level of automation of the important human action 
• task analysis of the important human action 
• analysis of human errors associated with the important human action 
• analysis of the staffing and qualifications associated with the human action 
 
These analyses should have already been performed.  However, if they have not, then they 
should be performed at this point so that the task requirements of the action are known. 
 
A general approach to making an HSI more error tolerant is to ensure that the primary task is 
supported.  Primary tasks are those directly related to system operations, including monitoring, 
detection, situation assessment, response planning, and response implementation.  To make sure 
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the primary task is supported, the key task elements have to be identified and explicitly 
addressed in the design.  Table HF-3 identifies these key elements.  
 
Next, secondary tasks should be minimized.  Secondary tasks are those performed when 
interfacing with the system, but are not directed to the primary task.  They may include: 
navigating through and paging displays, searching for data, and making decisions regarding how 
to configure the interface.  Minimizing these tasks helps prevent error because it leaves more 
attention and cognitive resources available for the primary tasks.  The existence of secondary 
tasks, such as display navigation, should be examined and minimized to the extent possible.  The 
use of several of the HSI design techniques identified above, such as a task-based display or a 
computer-based procedure, can help to minimize secondary tasks.  Modern display navigation 
techniques can also help.  For example, a mouse click on a sensor symbol for a controlled 
process variable can result in the display of the related process control system and related HSI in 
addition to obtaining a trend plot of the controlled variable.  
 
The analysis of human error (see Section 3.6) may have identified specific mechanisms for 
human error along with suggested design features to consider adding to the design to help 
manage or mitigate the errors.  For example, if two or more situations are very similar yet require 
different responses, mistaking one situation for the other is an error.  Designing HSI features to 
support personnel in discriminating between the situations can minimize this type of error.  This 
can involve something as simple as providing information on a display that identifies the key 
parameters that distinguish situation A from B and the current status of each.  This will aid 
personnel to evaluate the current conditions and identify which situation exists.  A more 
sophisticated solution is to develop a decision aid that automatically analyzes the conditions and 
identifies the correct situation.  
 
Finally, performance of important tasks can also be supported with procedures and specific 
training to provide the familiarization necessary to perform the tasks properly.  Training can 
identify specific task performance criteria, the mastery of which can be assessed as a normal part 
of the training program.  Training can also explicitly address potentially critical errors identified 
by the human error analysis or by the design team. 
 
It is also worth noting here that “Design for Maintainability” issues, which pertain to onboard 
maintenance activities both in shirtsleeve and EVA pressure suit work environments and are 
associated with ergonomic and anthropomorphic factors (NASA-STD-3000, sections 11 and 14), 
also impact design reliability in other spacecraft system domains such as mechanisms, avionics, 
GN&C. 
 
Additional information on HSI and procedure design can be found in the following sources. 
 
NASA STD-3000 Volumes I and II. 
NPR 8705.2A Section 3, and Appendix C.7-,C.8,C.9 
MIL-STD-1472 
O’Hara et al. (2002) NUREG-0711 rev 2 
O’Hara et al. (2005) EPRI 1010042 
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3.8   Training Program Design 
Personnel training is an important factor in ensuring safe and reliable system operation and 
maintenance.  The objective of a training program is to provide personnel with the skills, 
knowledge, and abilities to properly perform their roles and responsibilities.   
 
Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  General Considerations – The training program should be based on a “systems approach to 
training” methodology.  The overall scope of training should be defined including the 
following: 
 
• categories of personnel to be trained (e.g., flight crew, ground support)  
• categories of training (e.g., initial, refresher, just-in-time) 
• specific conditions (e.g., normal, contingency, emergency) 
• specific operational activities (e.g., maintenance) 
 
The roles of all organizations involved in the development of training should be identified and 
the qualifications of organizations and personnel involved in the development and conduct of 
training should be defined. 
 
2. Analyze Tasks and Identify Learning Objectives – Training programs should be based on the 
systematic analysis of job and task requirements.  This analysis should include the results 
from other HFE activities.  Learning objectives should be derived from an analysis of desired 
performance following training.  Learning objectives should address the knowledge and skill 
attributes associated with all relevant dimensions of the trainee’s job, such as interactions 
with the system, the HSIs, and other personnel.  
 
3. Develop the Content – The design of the training program should be defined to specify how 
learning objectives will be conveyed to the trainee.  The definition should include: 
 
•    The use of media such as lecture, simulation, and on-the-job training to convey 
particular categories of learning objectives 
•    Specific conditions and scenarios to be used 
•    Training implementation considerations such as the temporal order and schedule of 
training segments  
 
Factual knowledge should be taught within the context of actual tasks so that personnel learn to 
apply it in the work environment.  The context of the job should be defined, and it should be 
represented meaningfully to help trainees link knowledge to the job’s requirements.   
 
Training programs for developing skills should be structured so that the training environment is 
consistent with the level of skill being taught.  It should support skill acquisition and long-term 
retention by allowing trainees to manage cognitive demands.  For example, trainees should not 
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be placed in environments that teach high-level skills, such as coordinating control actions 
among crewmembers, before they have mastered requisite, low-level skills, such as how to 
manipulate control devices. 
 
Training should address strategies for decision-making related to subsystems, HSIs, and 
procedures.  It should include rules for accessing and interpreting information and heuristics for 
interpreting symptoms of failures of systems, HSIs, and procedures.   
 
4.  Training Facilities and Resources – Facilities and resources such as full-mission simulators, 
part-task training simulators, mockups, equipment replicas, and classrooms needed to satisfy 
training design requirements should be defined. 
 
5.  Implement Training – Implementation of training based on the learning objectives and 
prepared course content. 
 
6.  Evaluate and Modify the Training Program – Methods for evaluating the overall effectiveness 
of the training programs and trainee mastery of training objectives should be defined, 
including written and oral tests and review of personnel performance during walkthroughs, 
simulator exercises, and on-the-job.  Evaluation criteria for training objectives should be 
defined for individual training modules.  Evaluation and revision of the training based on the 
performance of trained personnel in the job setting should be built into the program.    
 
Methods for verifying the accuracy and completeness of training course materials should be 
defined as well.  Procedures for refining and updating the content and conduct of training should 
be established, including procedures for tracking training course modifications. 
 
7.  Provide Periodic Refresher – Personnel should undergo periodic refresher training.  Any 
changes or increases in refresher training should be evaluated. 
 
Additional information on Training Programs can be found in the following sources. 
 
NPR 7120.5C. 
U.S. Marine Corps. (2004) 
O’Hara et al (2004) 
3.9  HFE Verification and Validation 
V&V evaluations comprehensively determine that the design conforms to HFE principles and 
that it enables personnel to successfully perform their tasks to achieve system safety and 
operational goals.  The HFE aspects of V&V help to ensures that: 
• HSIs and procedures support task requirements 
• HSIs and procedures are designed to accommodate human capabilities and limitations 
• The integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel elements) meets 
mission objectives and performance requirements 
 
Key methodological elements are: 
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1.  HSI Task Support Verification – This is an evaluation to verify that the HSI and procedures 
support personnel task requirements, e.g., that all alarms, information, and control 
capabilities required for personnel tasks are provided, and that task requirements are defined 
by the task analyses.  The design is examined to verify that identified requirements are 
available in the design. 
 
2.  HFE Design Verification – This is an evaluation to verify that the HSI is designed to 
accommodate human capabilities and limitations as reflected in HFE guidelines.  The design 
should be evaluated to ensure its conformance with HFE guideline, such as those provided in 
NASA-STD-3000 (and its successors for the Constellation program) or a system style guide 
(see Section 3.8). 
 
3.  Integrated System Validation – This is an evaluation using performance-based tests to 
determine whether an integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel 
elements) meets performance requirements and supports safe and reliable operation of the 
system.  NPR8702.5 Section 1.6.6 mandates human-in-the-loop testing involving flight, 
ground processing, and mission support crews “to verify that the system design meets the 
human performance requirements during system operation and in-flight maintenance 
consistent with the anticipated mission operations concept and anticipated mission duration” 
(Requirement 34253).  This type of evaluation is also referred to as “operational testing” 
(Meister 1986).  This assessment will often be made using a high-fidelity simulator because 
it is often impractical to test how well the integrated system responds to design basis events 
with the actual system in the field. 
 
These evaluations identify potential design problems that should be assessed for importance and 
corrected if necessary. 
 
Additional information on V&V can be found in the following sources. 
 
NASA (2005) NPR8705.2A, Sec 1.6.6 
Charlton & O'Brien, (2002). 
DoD. (1998).  
Meister (1986). 
O'Hara, et al. (1997).   
Wise et al. (1993).  
3.10 In-Service Monitoring  
System evaluation should not end once a system is deployed in the field.  This activity is 
performed to identify and address issues and lessons learned that arise once a new system is in 
operation.  Examples include an incorrect label on a process display, an HSI function that 
behaves differently in the simulator than in the operational environment, and a change in the way 
a task is performed that creates unanticipated difficulties.  Treating these types of issues in a 
formal program can help to systematically identify and address issues, rather than depending 
upon anecdotal information and ad hoc fixes. 
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Key methodological elements are: 
 
1.  Planning and Administration – Specific planning for the in-service monitoring activity is 
essential. Resources and personnel are needed to support the monitoring activities.  Even 
though only modest effort will be required for most in-service monitoring, if no effort or 
funds are explicitly allocated to support it, it will not be done. 
 
2.  Establish a Team –To carry out effective in-service monitoring, it will be necessary to 
establish an In-Service Monitoring Team to be responsible for each portion of the activity.  
Over the monitoring period, the team will be responsible for: 
 
• collecting information 
• accessing individuals as necessary based on specialized expertise 
• analyzing and resolving identified issues 
• documenting the results of the in-service monitoring program and preparing brief 
summaries of the monitoring effort and the conclusions reached 
 
3.   Collect Data – Methods must be in place to enable personnel to not only identify problems 
that are observed, but also capture useful positive feedback.  Some of the methods used 
include:  problem reporting sheets users can use to record issues that arise, user interviews, 
and observation of work practices (where possible).  Ultimately, such information should 
contribute to an active “Lessons Learned” database. 
 
4.  Screen Issues for Importance – Issues identified should be evaluated by the team to determine 
their importance.   
 
5.  Develop and Implement Solutions – For significant issues, solutions need to be developed, 
tested, and implemented. 
 
Additional information on In-Service Monitoring can be found in the following sources: 
 
NPR 8705.2A Sec 1.6.6 
EPRI (2005) 
3.11  Test and Evaluation 
This activity is an integral part of the entire HFE process and spans the full design life cycle.  For 
example, tests and evaluations can be performed to resolve a tradeoff (i.e., whether to use touch 
screen or mouse input), obtain design information (i.e., determine the meaning of a set of icons), 
or to try out a new approach (i.e., web-like monitoring and control of remote equipment).  
Information from users also supports performing evaluations, for example, to evaluate whether 
the design meets performance requirements.  Tests and evaluations also provide a valuable 
means of obtaining information and feedback from users. 
 
Test and evaluation methods include: 
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• Interviews of users 
• Surveys, questionnaires, and rating scales 
• Focus groups 
• Observational studies 
• Walk-throughs using drawings, mockups, or prototypes 
• Performance-based tests, such as can be conducted on a full-mission simulator 
• Computer modeling 
 
Each has key methodological considerations that include the selection of participants, selection 
of test bed(s), scenario selection and design, test design, selection of performance measures and 
criteria for evaluation, and data analysis.  How each of these is addressed depends on the type of 
test/evaluation being performed and when it is performed (early versus late in the design 
process). 
 
Additional information on Test and Evaluation can be found in the following sources: 
 
NPR 8705.2A Sec 1.6.6 
Charlton & O'Brien, (2002). 
EPRI (2005) 
Meister (1986) 
O'Hara, et al. (1997).   
4.0 Historical Perspective and Past Performance 
4.1  Historical Perspective 
HFE, often termed “human engineering” in heritage NASA systems, was recognized for its 
specific role in aspects of spacecraft systems that were in direct contact with the flight crew.  
These aspects include only several of the contemporary HFE activities listed above in Section 
3.5.  Predominant among heritage HFE system activities were those associated with HSI and 
procedure design.  Other HFE spacecraft system DDT&E activities listed in Section 1.3, such as 
function analysis, task analysis, and risk analysis, were traditionally carried out within other 
organizations such as Systems Engineering (Goodman, 1972), often without the participation of 
formally trained HFE experts.  A series of 114 NASA Technical Notes4, published in the early 
and mid-1970’s, discusses design and development history of the various Apollo spacecraft 
systems.  Five of these Apollo experience reports associated with crew station integration are 
overtly in the purview of traditional human engineering (Allen & Nussman, 1976; Landoc & 
Nussman, 1975; Wittler, 1975; Hix, 1973; Wheelwright, 1973).  A much greater number of these 
Apollo experience reports describe HFE-like and HFE-related activities that were carried out by 
other organizations as part of development of their respective system elements.  (e.g., Hyle, 
                                                 
4Available at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/.  Search the archive for the term “Apollo experience report”, including the 
quotation marks. 
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Foggatt, & Weber, 1972; Burtzlaff, 1972; Graves & Harpold, 1972; Hyle & Lunde, 1972; and 
many others)  
 
Prominent among heritage space system HSI responsibilities were the design, development, test, 
and evaluation of “active” interfaces (i.e., display and controls—D&C) to monitor and operate 
the spacecraft, as well as the “passive” crew-vehicle interface elements such as seating, 
handholds, windows, and lighting.  Associated with both active and passive interface elements 
was the need to ensure that the crew could safely, effectively, and reliably use these space 
system components given the rigors of the space environment.  Thus, the role of human 
engineering was historically not only to develop and apply requirements for flight crew 
anthropometry (i.e., reach envelopes and force capabilities) and perceptual capacity (e.g., vision 
and audition), but also to attend to environment factors (e.g., hyper- and micro-gravity, vibration, 
atmosphere, thermal, radiation) ensuring that they were physiologically tolerable (i.e., habitable) 
and would not unacceptably impede crew task performance.  Ensuring that the spacecraft 
environment met human engineering habitability requirements was, in part, the responsibility of 
Environment Control and Life Support Systems.   
 
Critical human engineering data employed in the design of early NASA systems to ensure 
successful performance by the flight crew (including the impact of the space environment on 
habitability) were initially collected from early (post World War II) aerospace flight experience 
and associated laboratory studies into the Bioastronautics Data Books (NASA SP-3006, Edition 
1, 1964; Edition 2, 1973).  These early data along with interface design experience from Apollo 
and Skylab systems were ultimately consolidated into the Man-Systems Integration Standards 
(NASA-STD-3000, 1987; Rev B, 1995). 
 
Trends in human interface procedures and D&C design practices for crewed NASA systems are 
traceable back to the experimental aircraft of the 1950s, through sub-orbital, orbital (Mercury 
and Gemini) and lunar flight (Apollo).  The introduction and growth of onboard computer 
capabilities during the Apollo and later in the Shuttle programs first raised a still ongoing 
discussion of the roles of automated and manual systems and the relative allocation of control 
functions between the two.  Certain mission functions such as lunar landing were considered too 
critical to not be principally reliant upon direct manual control with through the window (plus 
other on-board instrument) feedback.  In general, automatic elements were designed to allow 
manual override in contingency operation (Landoc & Nussman, 1975).   
 
Initial research studies in spacecraft simulators of human performance as a quantitative indicator 
of system reliability, essentially a precursor to current human reliability analysis (HRA), started 
during the Gemini and Apollo programs. (Grodsky & Flaherty, 1965)  The general design 
philosophies that governed human interface design for Apollo Lunar Module (LM) and 
Command Module (CM) as listed by Landoc and Nussman (1975) are captured verbatim in 
Table HF-6.  Embodying what Landoc and Nussman term the “most fundamental and 
influential” requirements for D&C design and use, these philosophies followed principles from 
previous aerospace systems and actually preceded Apollo D&C development.  Recognizable in 
this list are antecedents that underlie many of the human system integration principles for 
robustness, redundancy, and reliability in the current NPR 8705.2A and NASA-STD-3000, and 
that are the foundation for HSIR and other CARD requirements presently in development.  Of 
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note, Landoc and Nussman’s list only provides single fault (i.e., “arm-fire”) as opposed to two-
fault (i.e., “ready-arm-fire” or “arm-arm-fire”) resistance to inadvertent human action.   
 
Table HF-6.  Fundamental and Influential Requirements for Apollo D&C Systems (Landoc 
& Nussman, 1975).  Associated NASA NPR8705.2A requirements are shown in red. 
 
4.2  Past Performance  
4.2.1 Failures and Successes 
The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team Report (NASA SIAT, 2000) identified a series of 
human factors problems in the Shuttle program and proposed a number of recommendations to 
alleviate them.  Central to these were workforce and human error management issues that will 
also need to be considered in future missions.  Key themes were the need for communication 
between workforce, engineering, and management, in order to foster cooperation and maintain 
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workforce trust and loyalty.  Workforce transitions and downsizing were observed to result in a 
loss of corporate technical and process knowledge and in stretching the workforce too thin.  
Importantly, the SIAT Report identified the need to incorporate human factors in decision 
processes as a means to eliminate the potential for single- and multiple-point failures.  
Additionally, the report recommended that human error management and safety metric 
development “should be supported aggressively and implemented program-wide.”   
 
Problem and error tracking is essential to gauging human error and safety performance.  NASA 
currently operates several PRACA databases, although additional incident information may also 
be stored in databases kept by contractors.  NASA’s system of reporting and storing incident 
information was criticized by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board under the heading of 
“dysfunctional databases.”  In 2000, the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team report also 
identified problems with the gathering, storage, and analysis of PRACA data within NASA.  Key 
findings were that the PRACA system: 
 
• Does not provide information needed by decision makers 
• Suffers from missing data and inconsistent treatment of events 
• Lacks sophisticated analysis tools 
• Is fragmented 
• Requires specific expertise and experience to extract incident information 
 
The SIAT team made several recommendations concerning problem reporting and tracking 
within NASA.  A key recommendation was that the PRACA system should be revised using 
state-of-the-art database design and information management techniques. 
4.2.2 Examples of Human Factors Failures and Successes 
Human-induced threats can occur at all stages of the system life cycle through Design, 
Manufacture, Test, Operate, and Maintain.  At each of these stages, human capabilities can also 
enable systems to recover from, or contain the effects of, non-routine events.  The 1997 collision 
of a Progress vehicle with the Mir space station and the consequent Spektr depressurization 
serves to illustrate this point.  A variety of human factors failures from perceptual-motor 
performance, fatigue, and training currency, through to more global, ground-based organizational 
policy and international political issues can be seen as contributors to the accident.  At the same 
time, the on-board crew contributed the resilience in recovering from the emergency that 
ultimately prevented loss of life and loss of the vehicle.  (Ellis, 2000). 
 
The following four case studies further illustrate how human performance can degrade or support 
system reliability.  In the first two cases, the systems did not perform reliably because the design 
of the system was not well matched to human performance.  The last two case studies illustrate 
how human intervention can enable a system to recover from an undesirable and unplanned-for 
condition.   
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Salyut 11 Decompression (Example of mismatch between operational demands and human 
capabilities) 
On June 30, 1971, the Soyuz 11 capsule was returning to earth with three crewmembers on 
board.  At an altitude of 168 km, as the capsule separated from the orbital module, misfiring 
pyrotechnic devices caused a pressure equalization valve to open prematurely. The valve began 
to vent the capsule atmosphere, a process that took between 30-50 seconds.  There is evidence 
that the crew responded to the emergency by attempting to manually close the valve.  The 
procedure to close the valve would have taken the crew around 60 seconds to perform, and the 
cosmonauts perished before the valve was half-closed.  It appears that system designers did not 
take into account the speed with which a human operator could operate the control. (Newkirk, 
1990; Johnson, 1980). 
 
Genesis spacecraft G switches (Example of lack of test procedure to detect a human deviation) 
A critical element of the Genesis spacecraft was a set of G switches designed to trigger the 
deployment of the spacecraft’s parachutes.  Due to errors in assembly drawings, the sensors were 
installed upside down.  As a result, parachutes did not deploy when the spacecraft returned to 
earth.  A centrifuge test that would have detected the error was deleted due to schedule pressure.  
In this sense, system reliability was degraded because of the absence of a “safety net” that would 
have captured a human error (Kerr, 2004; NASA, 2006). 
 
FOD in Orbiter (Example of utilization of human capabilities in a non-routine maintenance 
situation—”diving catch”) 
An example of a “diving catch” provided by the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team Report is 
of maintenance personnel finding a lint-free pad stuffed in a tube prior to brazing a water line in 
the forward compartment (NASA SIAT, 2000).  Maintenance personnel caught the problem 
outside of normal procedures.  This case illustrates how unplanned human interventions during 
ground processing can contribute to the reliability of a system.  Numerous other examples of 
“diving catches” are cited in Appendix 3 of the SIAT report.  
 
A “lessons learned” appendix in the SIAT report lists a series of commercial aviation accidents 
in which causes ascribed to mechanical failure fundamentally were a consequence of human 
performance errors during maintenance.  Many of the occupational stress contributors in these 
aviation accidents could also be observed in the Shuttle program at the time.  Proposed measures 
to alleviate the potential for errors include use of human error management techniques and the 
incorporation of safety tracking metrics. 
 
Apollo 13 (Example of use of human capabilities in a non-routine operational situation) 
The example of Apollo 13 is given here as an example of how human intervention can enable 
systems to recover from unanticipated emergencies.  After an explosion in a liquid oxygen tank 
damaged the service module of Apollo 13, the crew flew part of their return to earth with the 
unused lunar module still attached to the command module.  This configuration, which had never 
been flown before, allowed the Apollo 13 crew to use the lunar module as a temporary 
“lifeboat”.  The safe return of the crew required problem-solving and creative thinking by 
mission control personnel and astronauts.  A frequently cited example of this is the creation of a 
jury-rigged carbon dioxide scrubber that prevented CO2 from reaching dangerous levels.  While 
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it is not possible to predict and plan for every conceivable emergency, reliable systems provide 
operators with the opportunity to apply creativity and flexibility to unanticipated problems. 
(Shayler, 2000) 
5.0 Summary/“Best Practices” Indicators 
Human-system interaction occurs in all phases of system development and operation of 
spacecraft systems.  These phases include 1) design, 2) fabrication (build), 3) testing, 4) 
operation, and 5) maintenance.  Therefore all of the indicators/questions listed below need to be 
evaluated for each phase of the spacecraft lifespan.   
5.1   System Attributes 
Considering system attributes that would accommodate and promote effective, safe, reliable and 
robust human interaction with spacecraft systems asks the following questions. 
 
• Are system demands compatible with human limitations?  Do they capitalize on human 
capabilities?  
 
• Can the tasks demanded of people be performed reliably including under adverse 
conditions? 
 
• Can the system can tolerate and recover from human-induced deviations? 
 
• Has two-failure tolerance been built into the system wherever feasible? 
 
• Can the system enable human capabilities to be brought to bear on non-routine, 
unanticipated problems? 
 
• Does the system keep humans in the loop and enable humans to take action in situations 
that cannot be handled by automation? 
5.2   Program Attributes 
The HFE program is undertaken to achieve HFE goals and key product attributes for system 
reliability and robustness.  The general characteristics of an HFE program for high-reliability 
systems should have the following key attributes: 
 
1. Is the HFE program fully integrated into the overall engineering process from the outset?  
 
2. Are the HFE aspects of a system should be developed, designed, and evaluated on the 
basis of a systems analysis that uses a “top-down” approach?  Top-down refers to an 
approach starting at the “top” of the hierarchy with the system’s high-level mission and 
goals.  The detailed design (of the interfaces, support systems, procedures, and training) 
is the “bottom” of the top-down process.  
 
3. Is HFE considered to span the full life cycle; i.e., from concept planning through 
operations and ultimately decommissioning/disposal?  
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4. Are HFE activities graded to focus the level of HFE design to where it will have greatest 
need in the design process?  
5.3   Core HFE Activities 
The HFE program comprises eleven core activities that need to be performed by the 
organizations (NASA, primary contractors, subcontractor) involved in the design and evaluation 
process.  Associated with each of the eleven core HFE activities are a number of best practices to 
be evaluated. 
 
1. HFE Program Planning  
Does the HFE Program identify: 
• general HFE program goals and scope? 
• high-level concept of operations for the new system? 
• HFE design team skills necessary to conduct subsequent HFE activities?  
• engineering procedures (such as QA and use of an issues tracking system) to be 
followed? 
• description of HFE products and documentation of analysis and results? 
• key milestones and scheduled to ensure the timely completion of HFE products? 
 
Are the results of the planning activity documented in a human factors program plan that can be 
used to manage the overall HFE effort?  
 
2. Operating Experience Review and Lessons Learned  
Are Operating Experience Review (OER) and Lessons Learned documents maintained and 
readily accessible to the design team?  Do they provide a clear indication of issues identified, the 
design activities to which they are relevant, and their importance?  
 
3. Function Analysis and Allocation  
Have the various functions needed to achieve the mission been described?  Has the allocation of 
responsibility for conducting functions, or parts of functions, to personnel, to automatic systems, 
or to some combination of the two been made?  Is the allocation made on the basis of a function 
analysis to determine what is required to perform the function?  Have the roles and 
responsibilities of personnel and automation in the performance of system functions, including 
how they may be changed as a result of various types of failure conditions?  
 
4. Task Analysis 
Do the task analyses specify the requirements for successful task performance, e.g., what alarms, 
information, controls, communications, and procedures are needed?  
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5. Staffing, Qualifications, and Integrated Work Design 
Has it been determined how those tasks should be assigned to crewmembers and what overall 
staffing levels are required? In particular, has the analysis (1) allocated human tasks to individual 
crewmembers, (2) evaluated the qualifications need for crewmember positions to accomplish 
their assigned tasks, and (3) evaluated the overall impact of all tasks when they are considered in 
an integrated fashion?  
 
6. Human Error and Reliability Analysis  
Have significant personnel tasks (i.e., those that impact mission success, the safety of system 
operations, and where personnel safety is an issue) been identified and analyzed in detail? Have 
these been evaluated with sufficient detail so that error tolerant design strategies (minimize 
personnel errors, allow their detection, and provide recovery capability) can be applied to 
manage them, e.g., through the design of Human-System Interfaces, procedures, training, and 
automation? 
 
7. Human-System Interface and Procedure Design 
Does the HSI provide the resources needed by personnel to interact with the systems? Do HSIs 
and procedures that (1) reflect the system’s functional and physical design, (2) meet personnel 
task requirements, (3) exhibit the general characteristics of well-designed HSI and procedures, 
and (4) are easy to learn and use?   
 
8. Training Program Design 
Does the training program provide personnel with the skills, knowledge, and abilities to properly 
perform their roles and responsibilities?  Is the training program should be based on a systems 
approach, including the identification of learning objectives, development the course content, 
implementation of training, evaluation and modification of the training program, and periodic 
refresher training? 
 
9. HFE Verification and Validation 
Do the V&V evaluations comprehensively determine that the design conforms to HFE principles 
and that it enables personnel to successfully perform their tasks to achieve system safety and 
operational goals?  Do the HFE aspects of V&V help ensure that HSIs and procedures support 
task requirements, HSIs and procedures are designed to accommodate human capabilities and 
limitations, and that the integrated system design (i.e., hardware, software, and personnel 
elements) meets mission objectives and performance requirements? 
 
10. In-Service Monitoring 
Does system evaluation continue once the system is deployed in the field? Does this activity 
identify and address issues and lessons learned that arise once a new system is in operation? 
 
11. Test and Evaluation 
Is this activity an integral part of the entire HFE process and does it span the design life-cycle? 
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